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Creative Commons
Copyright—the law, but also the very word—has an identity problem. Tojudge from most mainstream media coverage of intellectual property dis-
putes, and the big-media talking points that tend to frame that coverage,
copyright is binary, a single switch: when turned off, the result is piracy; in the
on position, we have property. (It is not clear how or when these became per-
fect antonyms, but George Orwell might have a theory). A person or organiza-
tion is either pro- or anti-copyright. New technologies are either good for
copyright, or bad for copyright. One either believes or does not believe in file-
sharing networks. There is no place for the agnostic.
Nor even the protestant: those who believe in this thing called “copyright”
as a general matter—but who may differ over its particulars, who propose
that the concept has many possible meanings, who dare to ask what the pur-
pose of copyright should be—are cast as heretics. A generalization, of course,
but nonetheless an accurate description of the conventional wisdom on copy-
right today.
If, though, you press an actual author—a writer, a musician, a coder, a
teacher—on his or her religion, you’re likely to get a more nuanced answer. I
don’t mean this as a hypothetical exercise; I do this daily as part of my job
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managing the nonprofit organization Creative Commons. I push authors to
describe precisely what they want other people to do or not do with their cre-
ations and, once we get past the knee-jerk Manichean response, a number of
different values begin to emerge, values much more meaningful and precise
than simply copyright, piracy, or property. Here are paraphrases of the kinds
of things I hear regularly:
• I don’t care if people trade my band’s recordings online, but I don’t
want one of them to wind up in a political advertisement or some-
thing like that.
• I would like other people to build upon my software, but they should
share the software that results from that work on the same generous
terms I’ve offered.
• I would be happy for teachers to use my nanotechnology article in
their classes or syllabi, but I wouldn’t want some company using it to
train their employees without telling or paying me.
• I love the Net because it makes it easy to get my poems out there,
even to total strangers all the way across the globe. But I do worry
about someone passing off my stuff as their own. 
• I really like some of the remixes fans have made from my songs, but
others are just awful. 
• I have a low-resolution gallery of my photographs up on my website
to attract interest and get more exposure. If people want the high-
quality stuff, or prints, I charge them.
• I put the promotional trailer of my film onto a file-sharing network
myself, without telling my distributor. But I would panic if I saw my
whole movie online somewhere. 
Context, reputation, exposure, commercial value, aesthetics, credit, pres-
entation, formatting, partial use—these are a few of the many connotations
that copyright conjures up for authors, the values and combinations of values
that the single word represents to different people. 
Do the same Rorschach exercise with a lawyer and you’ll also get a multi-
part response—but a slightly different and more definite one. In law, copy-
right describes a group of many different rights; it is like a surname, or a
genus. Copyright is a series of switches, or better still, dials. In the default set-
ting, all the dials are set to the maximum. A copyright lawyer (like me) might
explain it like this:
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A copyright holder enjoys a set of rights in a bit of expression that is
fixed in some tangible medium (a “work”). These separate rights include
the exclusive rights:
• to copy the work
• to distribute copies of the work
• to exploit the copies commercially
• to make derivative works based upon the work, including but
not limited to abridgments, arrangements, dramatizations,
motion picture versions, or sound recordings
• to perform the work (in cases of dramatic or musical works) 
and others. 
These exclusive rights can be configured in any number of combinations, at
least by those who can afford to pay lawyers to custom-calibrate them. They are
limited by a small set of countervailing legal doctrines—fair use and first-sale
among them. But practically speaking, these limitations (1) offer little guidance
to users of copyrighted material, (2) are very difficult to explain to most authors,
and (3) can be very expensive to argue successfully in a court of law.
All this is meant to emphasize two points. First, copyright, despite its
monochromatic reputation, is in both everyday practice and theory better
described as a spectrum. Second, this spectrum looks different viewed
through a legal lens on the one hand and a cultural one on the other. Indeed,
in some respects, a massive gap separates copyright’s social and legal mean-
ings, the motley bundle of authorial values described above and the linear set
of property rights set out by copyright act. This is particularly true the farther
one moves from the corporate cultural centers of Hollywood and Madison
Avenue and into the real source of most of the copyrighted material produced
today: the legions of amateurs, in the purest sense of the word, building a
massive body of culture online (and offline as well— though the gap between
creative culture and the law that governs has expanded as a function of ever
cheaper and faster distribution and editing technologies and the legal back-
lash against them.).
Copyright’s forked spectrum does overlap in some important respects:
authors’ concerns about commercialization, the partial use of their works,
and the circumstances under which they may be transformed map well onto
the enumerated rights of copyright. But in many areas, the differential in val-
ues is striking: copyright law says nothing about reputational concerns (this is
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trademark’s domain), is deliberately silent about aesthetics, and offers little
guidance on formatting or quality-of-media issues. Most important (by far),
the full-bore protection of default copyright rules often directly clashes with
authors’ wishes to have their works re-distributed or shared—and by the
same token clashes with readers’ (and potential authors’) expectations about
what is proper or improper to do with those works.
The free and open source Software movements deserve the credit for pio-
neering an ingenious way to bridge this divide: not through litigation or direct
policy advocacy—which is expensive and, in today’s Hollywood-lobbied
Congress, often fruitless—but rather through retrofitting copyright with volun-
tary licensing and contractual tools. Specifically, and most notable among the
movement, Richard Stallman’s GNU General Public License used private law
tools to build into copyright law one of the bedrock principles of the coder cul-
ture: that, regardless of what else one might do with it, code must always
remain accessible, free to build upon, and free to re-distribute. The GNU GPL,
like all F/OSS licenses, crystallizes a norm the law has yet to acknowledge.
Creative Commons uses the same sort of legal hack to formalize norms in
the world of non-software copyrights. Our tagline, “some rights reserved,” not
only invites people to recognize copyright for the multi-part spectrum that it
is, it also reflects the preferences of most everyday authors on the Net (or so
went our hunch, which is increasingly proving correct). We offer users who
want to free up distribution of their work a set of conditions they may require
in exchange: require attribution, prohibit commercialization, prohibit deriva-
tive works, require that derivatives be shared on the same terms as their
source material. Each option is represented by an icon intentionally designed
to echo the ubiquitous, and thus increasingly meaningless, copyright © (we
like hacking cultural symbols as well as the laws they represent.). These
options—norms made law via private ordering—grew out of informal surveys
of and conversations with different kinds of authors.
So here’s where anthropology comes in, and why its contribution to the
copyright debate is crucial—indeed could very well form what values the next
generation’s copyright will reflect. 
Lawyers are not very good at spotting normative trends. We’re not trained
for it. In fact we’re trained against it: a good judge or lawyer, we learn, recog-
nizes when she’s strayed too far into the topsy-turvy world of culture, politics,
or art. This is particularly true where norms involve questions of aesthetics:
you don’t want lawyers spotting beauty, and we’re too scared to even try. As
Oliver Wendell Holmes put it, in the seminal copyright decision Bleistein v.
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Mazer: “The taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.” In decid-
ing that even a simple promotional poster for a circus was copyrightable,
Holmes articulated a broader principle about the institutional competence of
judges: “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”
This sounds wise, but here is the catch: copyright is about nothing but the
regulation of aesthetic expression. On the one hand, Holmes says don’t play
art critic, but on the other, all copyright disputes come down to questions like,
“What is the difference between parody and satire?,” “What is originality?,”
“Are these works substantially similar?,” “Is this alteration transformative?,”
“Is this work closer to a Platonic ideal, or more like a specific incarnation of
that ideal?” What is a judge or policymaker to do? 
They should punt to culture, to use Kelty’s phrase (as appropriated from me,
I should note—ego is another value embedded in the culture of copyright). The
arbiters of copyright must defer to a consensus among those who must play art
and cultural critic, a consensus identified through the adverse testimony of bat-
tling expert witness-artists, or through the development of a norm so deep and
broad-based that legislators take it for granted as correct and true.
More often than not, however, copyright policymakers do not recognize
the limits of their institutional competence. They declare recombinant forms
of art artless, or simply piratical, without a hint of self-awareness that an aes-
thetic or cultural judgment is being made, that certain emergent tastes are
indeed being held, if not in outright contempt, then to a higher standard than
established forms of art. In the mouths of judges and politicians, copyright
hysteria can sound uncannily like the rhetoric of obscenity wars of past gen-
erations (information itself is said to be “promiscuous,” and indeed the
Recording Industry Association of American argues, pretextually, that it wants
to stop file-sharing because it wants to stop porn.) Like Justice Stewart Potter
trying to define obscenity decades ago, many policymakers today operate on
a hunch when trying to distinguish a clear-cut legal violation from a subtle bit
of artistic innovation. It is hard to imagine anything further from aesthetic
neutrality or transcendent principles than the jurisprudence of “I know it
when I see it.” And yet that’s how it tends to work.
All of this is bad news for traditional legal activism in the copyright field—
for progressive litigators and lobbyists—as I’ve mentioned before. But it also
means that the battle over copyright has become a battle of attitudes, thus
opening up new opportunities for the new brand of copyright policymakers, the
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norm entrepreneurs: the legal hacker, the policy-savvy artist, the copyright-cult
anthropologist. These opportunities take roughly two forms: first, if it is the case
that judges’ and policymakers’ notions of creativity and regulation stem from
unconsciously held background beliefs, it is the copyright entrepreneur’s job to
expose those taken-for-granted attitudes and begin to sow doubt among prac-
ticing authors and readers—to use the tools of analysis and critique to break up
monolithic attitudes about copyright and spark real debate. 
The second opportunity is more interesting, more promising, and insidious-
ly more activist. I like to call this approach to copyright reform “creative civil
obedience.” The idea is to build a parallel system of copyright within the cur-
rent system, to use contract and copyright law and technology to build a shad-
ow copyright system, a more balanced system that better reflects the prefer-
ences of the emerging creative culture. This world of alternative copyright can
act as a haven for copyright progressives, but its significance is larger: it also
serves as a draft for copyright’s future, a model for what copyright could or
should look like. There has been little formal cooperation between lawyers and
anthropologists in this area until now, but the more that the lawyers come to
realize that the real action in the copyright debate takes place far from the
courtroom, in the wilds of culture, the more they should turn to the natives of
norms—anthropologist and artists—to lay plans for this new system.
 
